Robert J. Bidinotto's Post: FROM EMOTIONS, TO NARRATIVES, TO IDEOLOGIES -- and my Response

Below I’m sharing a post by Robert J. Bidinotto. Robert has been influential in Objectivist (the name of Ayn Rand's philosophy) circles since the 1980s. Before turning to writing a series of thrillers he served as editor-in-chief of The Atlas Society’s monthly magazine of politics and culture, The New Individualist. Robert and I met in college in the early 1970s when he introduced me to the work of Ayn Rand. Robert’s post starts below followed by my response. 

ROBERT’S POST: FROM EMOTIONS, TO NARRATIVES, TO IDEOLOGIES.

In intellectual circles, it is common to believe that ideology is a decisive social force on its own -- that abstract philosophical systems underlie societies and cultures; and that to change a society, you need only promulgate a different philosophy/ideology.

Of course, intellectuals *want* to believe in the decisive "power of ideas," because as promulgators of ideas, this belief confirms their lofty view of their own social importance and power. And certainly the connection of ideologies to societies, movements, and governments is obvious and undeniable -- which is why I used to accept this conventional view, too.

But a lifetime of promoting philosophical ideas has caused me to reconsider my views about the role of philosophy/ideology in human life and society. Introspection, observation of people close to me, and sobering realizations about how marginal and fleeting the impacts of philosophical persuasion, by myself and by many other skilled communicators, have been -- all of that has led me to conclude that personal and cultural change is much more complicated than simply spreading the "right" philosophical ideas.

Summarized simply, I believe...

...that the vast majority of people, including intellectuals, are actually driven not by ideas, but by emotions, often fairly crude ones, rooted in values, often only implicit;

...that over time, these values-laden emotions, if widely shared, are transformed into Narratives -- into inspiring popular myths, legends, and stories -- which provide explanations and justifications for those feelings;

...that only later do the more intellectual believers in these emotionally appealing, values-laden stories, myths, and Narratives try to buttress them with more sophisticated, abstract theoretical rationalizations -- i.e., with explanatory philosophies, ideologies, theologies, etc. The intellectuals do this to flesh out and support the core themes and underlying motives of their Narratives, granting them the social weight and gravitas of an "intellectual" image and justification.

You see that pattern historically with every creed that has attracted significant followings and becomes a mass movement. They start with a set of core emotions, driven by values broadly shared across a large social group; then follows the development of a popular mythology that dramatizes and evokes the group's shared emotions and values; and finally comes a complex theoretical rationalization for the mythological Narrative (and its values-driven emotions), crafted by the social group's intellectuals. In this last stage, the abstract system can take on a life of its own: it is taught and promoted in "movement" schools and texts, to which believers cling tightly, because it offers reassuring intellectual support and explanations for their underlying feelings and Narratives.

But the foundational appeal of philosophical, ideological, or theological systems does not lie in their theoretical abstractions themselves; pure abstractions carry no emotional appeal or motivational power. Instead, the believers' commitments are fundamentally to their core Narrative -- to the explanatory mythology or story -- and to the emotions and values it embodies and evokes. All that the theoretical abstractions offer are rationalizations and reassurance that the story is valid.

This explains why you can so often argue with someone using reason, logic, and overwhelming facts, until you are blue in the face, and get nowhere. Or why a person's "intellectual" commitments can seem so shallow and fleeting. Or why politicians and dictators rely so heavily on storytelling about their target constituencies' collective "identity," in the form of a high-stakes drama about villains (their political adversaries), victims (their constituents), and heroic rescuers (themselves). Or why a person's (or society's) "conversion" requires not just a new ideological argument, but instead begins with an emotional upheaval rooted in profound personal dissatisfaction with the status quo -- and which then leads to a confrontation with some appealing new Narrative that promises the dissatisfied individual a fresh identity: a meaningful new life role and purpose. The philosophical argument then comes along as a reassuring explanation for the wisdom of the conversion; but it alone is not the motivator of the conversion.

Let me emphasize that an abstract philosophy *can* serve legitimate and important purposes. It does not have to offer merely a sophistic rationalization for a bogus Narrative. If the Narrative is grounded in reality, then philosophy can provide a valid *rationale* for it. A rationale differs from a rationalization, because the former is true (based on reality), while the latter is false. And a valid rationale can flesh out our understanding, teasing out many important and helpful implications of the Narrative.

But, to sum up, I now believe that personal persuasion and cultural change require us to effectively present a compelling alternative Narrative to those people open to its emotional appeal. Not everyone is -- not by a long shot. People who are emotionally committed to a Narrative that defines them, their identity, and their life purpose -- but which is hostile to one's own values -- aren't going to change, no matter how skilled and logical your presentation of facts and arguments. Abstract arguments will never penetrate the emotional/values barriers surrounding a contrary Narrative. Even a compelling counter-Narrative will not prove persuasive unless the target of your communication is already deeply dissatisfied with his own, and thus searching for (or at least open to) a fresh worldview.

One corollary point, and it's important. I believe people with good values, and correspondingly good emotions, will be attracted to good Narratives -- and perhaps later, to good philosophies. The fact that they, too, are "Narrative-driven" is *not* necessarily a bad thing: it doesn't mean they are *irrationally* driven. If a kid is raised without any explicit philosophy, or even a bad one, yet becomes enamored of heroes in TV shows, movies, and comic books (oops, "graphic novels"), and then, inspired, goes on to do great things - - is that irrational?

To my Objectivist friends, I would point out that I've just described the childhood-to-adulthood trajectory of your heroine, Ayn Rand, if you know anything about her autobiography. After all, *she* didn't start out with a conceptual philosophical understanding of the world; she started out, in the hellish environment of post-revolutionary Soviet Russia, simply as a brilliant child who became captivated by heroic literature and movies. That *emotional* orientation, driven by some core values she didn't understand at the time, were sufficient to propel her on a remarkable journey to becoming, as an adult, a storyteller and philosopher whose worldview was opposite everything around her.

And those values-driven emotions first took form as a romantic Narrative of heroic individualism. That Narrative was a core part of her character by the time she reached her early teens. Rand didn't even encounter Aristotle, Aquinas, Spinoza, and other thinkers who influenced her philosophical thinking until college -- by which time *her character and sense of life was already formed*. Her systematic philosophy did not fully take form until she was middle-aged, during the writing of ATLAS SHRUGGED; and I would argue that she managed to become a heroic individualist long before figuring it all out.

Again, Rand's life and character were shaped indelibly and enduringly by a Narrative -- not by abstract philosophy or ideology. If that is true of her, then how can it not be true of others? Do we need formal, systematic philosophy in order to be rational, honest, independent, just, and productive? Were there no such people on Planet Earth before Rand incorporated those virtues formally into her Objectivist system?

I commend to you her book THE ROMANTIC MANIFESTO, especially its opening chapters, where -- in words different from mine here, but I believe very similar in meaning -- she explains the enormous power of stories, of Narratives, in shaping the human soul and our world.

--------------------------------------------

MY RESPONSE

I agree with Bidinotto's position on this. I’d add a couple corollary points that don’t contradict his. (At least I don’t think they do!)

1.  We are influenced by dozens of subconscious cognitive biases such as confirmation bias. We think we’re being objective without realizing how much of what we believe is influenced by these biases.

2.  Once we form our favored narratives, we tend to get our news from sources that reflect these narratives and discount someone who cites sources considered untrustworthy. This becomes a self-supporting cycle in which people consume news only from their trusted sources and don’t expose themselves to other sources. For instance, I’ve seen arguments between a liberal who cites CNN while the conservative who relies on Fox. 

3.  We also have different languages. Arnold Kling’s book The Three Languages of Politics explains how liberals see things in terms of the oppressed versus the oppressors. Conservatives see the world as a conflict of civilization (law and order) versus barbarism. And libertarians think everything boils down to freedom versus coercion.

4.  While we have our rational side we still are influenced by our evolutionary tribal roots. As a result, we often see the world in terms of “us versus them.” (The Coddling of the American Mind by Jonathan Haidt and Greg Lukianoff identifies three “untruths” that many of our current youth have accepted: What doesn’t kill you makes you weaker; always trust your feelings; and life is a battle between good people and evil people.)

When discussing issues with people who I know don’t share my framework I’ve tried to come up with an approach that plants a seed of doubt. I’ve collected information from sources I think the person I’m talking to is more likely to accept to get them to open their mind a crack. It takes some work but it can be done!

Confirmation Bias, Cherry-Picking, and Echo Chambers by Ed Latimore

This post by Ed Latimore offers a good description of common errors people make when forming their opinions and how to combat them.

Gell-Mann Amnesia: What is it?

I recently learned about a term created by Michael Crichton, author of Jurassic Park, Jaws and Andromeda Strain. He identified something he labeled the Gell-Mann Amnesia. (Crichton named it after a friend, Nobel Prize-winning physicist Murray Gell-Mann who discovered and named the quark.)

“Briefly stated, the Gell-Mann Amnesia effect is as follows. You open the newspaper to an article on some subject you know well. In Murray’s case, physics. In mine, show business. You read the article and see the journalist has absolutely no understanding of either the facts or the issues. Often, the article is so wrong it actually presents the story backward—reversing cause and effect. I call these the “wet streets cause rain” stories. Paper’s full of them.”

I have seen amnesia in action with people I know. As an example, I know a married couple who are devout Catholics. They distrust the reporting of The Boston Globe because they believe the Globe harbors an anti-Catholic bias. Yet they believe everything else the Globe says! I guess the Globe is biased only on one subject. Right?

I think there is another version of Gell-Mann Amnesia. Here is an example. During the Trump administration the media harped endlessly on his alleged collusion with Russia. When the Mueller report showed that there were no such ties, the people I know who bought into the Russia-gate story conveniently forgot how they were misled for years then move on to the next story. Their faith in their trusted news sources remains intact.

What scientific term or concept ought to be more widely known? Russell Conjugation - Eric Weinstein

What scientific term or concept ought to be more widely known?

I came across a reference to something called the Russell Conjugation, an idea created by the philosopher Bertrand Russell. (It’s also called an emotive conjugation.) It consists of three statements that describe the same behavior from different perspectives. Here is an example from an article by Eric Weinstein.

I am firm. [Positive empathy]

You are obstinate. [Neutral to mildly negative empathy]

He/She/It is pigheaded. [Very negative empathy]

As Weinstein explains:

In order to understand the concept properly you have to appreciate that most words and phrases are actually defined not by a single dictionary description, but rather two distinct attributes:

I) The factual content of the word or phrase.

II) The emotional content of the construction.

How would this apply to political disagreements? Would it be the following? “I am right (because I have the correct principles). You are mistaken (because your principles are wrong). They are evil (because they have no principles, or their principles are evil).” In this case, “I” refers to yourself. “You” refers to a friend who disagrees with you. “They” refers to a politician or pundit who is on the other side.

I pose it this way because I think we are not likely to label a friend as evil. If we believe a friend is evil, why are we friends? But it is much easier for us to call someone we don’t know evil precisely because we don’t have a personal connection. As philosophers like Jonathan Haidt (The Righteous Mind) remind us, our psychology has deep tribal roots. Many experiments run by researchers show that they can get participants form us vs. them groups based on superficial qualities such as eye color or sports team affiliation. (See more at this You Are Not So Smart episode.)

I know that my observation on how we label friends versus people we don’t know doesn’t hold up all the time. I know friends who have disowned family members or have terminated friendships over political disagreements such as which presidential candidate to for. But I also know people who haven’t done this.

Elon Musk Thinks Every Child Should Learn About These 50 Cognitive Biases | Inc.com

Elon Musk Thinks Every Child Should Learn About These 50 Cognitive Biases | Inc.com

https://twitter.com/elonmusk/status/1472647410568642564?s=20

The article in Inc. lists the 50 cognitive biases that Elon Musk thinks kids should be taught about in school. The second link takes you to the tweet Musk posted that shows these biases in an infographic. Given the number of these biases covering them would require a course dedicated to them. (This list, by the way, isn't comprehensive.)

Understanding the Divide Between Social Justice Advocates and the Left-Leaning "Anti-Woke" Community

Understanding the Divide Between Social Justice Advocates and the Left-Leaning "Anti-Woke" Community

The article at this link on the Clearer Thinking website does a nice job describing the positions of the "woke" left versus the "anti-woke" left. They use steelmanning to outline the positions both sides take on a variety of issues. (Steelmanning involves trying to strengthen the argument of the opposing side before trying to refute it.)

It would have been nice if they would have included libertarians and conservatives in this exercise! Of course if had done this the article would be twice as long.

Bari Weiss on cancel culture, leaving The New York Times and self-censorship - Deseret News

Bari Weiss on cancel culture, leaving The New York Times and self-censorship - Deseret News

Hat tip to Robert Bidinotto for this article by Bari Weiss, a former writer for The New York Times. The article’s subtitle sums it nicely: “In red America and blue America, an epidemic of self-censorship is threatening democracy.” This article resonated with me because it touches on things I’ve seen and makes cogent observations. The fact that Weiss comes from the left reveals that the right doesn’t hold a monopoly on self-censorship. As a resident of deep blue New England, I have friends on the right who don’t dare to speak up in social settings to avoid the cloudburst of indignation that will rain down on them. At the outdoor tennis club where I play in the summer, my conservative friends whisper to each other about politics. Meanwhile, their liberal friends on adjoining courts loudly mock anyone who even thought about voting for Trump or didn’t vote for Biden. My conservative or Republican friends have another reason why they don’t talk openly about their beliefs: they fear that they won’t be invited to play in these other groups and will be shunned.

Weiss starts her article noting some examples of intolerance on the right then switches her aim to the left. (Weiss provides some revealing statistics on this at the end of her piece.)

[T]here are two illiberal cultures swallowing up the country. I know because I live in blue America, in a world awash in NPR tote bags and front lawn signs proclaiming the social justice bonafides of the family inside.

In my America, the people who keep quiet don’t fear the wrath of Trump supporters. They fear the illiberal left.

…

Maybe you are among this self-silencing majority. There is a good chance that you are if the biologist Bret Weinstein is right when he observes that the population is composed of four groups: the few who actually hunt witches, a large group that goes along and a larger group that remains silent. There’s also a tiny group that opposes the hunt. And that “final group — as if by magic — become witches.”

…

That world I was born into was liberal. I don’t mean that in the partisan sense, but in the classical and therefore the most capacious sense of that word. It was a liberal consensus shared by liberals and conservatives, Republicans and Democrats.

The consensus view relied on a few foundational truths that seemed as obvious as the blue of the sky: the belief that everyone is created in the image of God; the belief that everyone is equal because of it; the presumption of innocence; a revulsion to mob justice; a commitment to pluralism and free speech, and to liberty of thought and of faith.

…

Most importantly, this worldview insisted that what bound us together was not blood or soil, but a commitment to a shared set of ideas. Even with all of its failings, the thing that makes America exceptional is that it is a departure from the notion, still prevalent in so many other places, that biology, birthplace, class, rank, gender, race are destiny.

For some reason Weiss chooses a rather indirect way of saying that the American classical liberalism rests on a belief in individualism. Believing that your destiny springs from “biology, birthplace, class, rank, gender, race” are forms of collectivism.

This old consensus — every single aspect of it — has been run over by the new illiberal orthodoxy. Because this ideology cloaks itself in the language of progress, many understandably fall for its self-branding. Don’t. It promises revolutionary justice, but it threatens to drag us back into the mean of history, in which we are pitted against one another according to tribe. [Emphasis added.]

The primary mode of this ideological movement is not building or renewing or reforming, but tearing down. Persuasion is replaced with public shaming. Forgiveness is replaced with punishment. Mercy is replaced with vengeance. Pluralism with conformity; debate with de-platforming; facts with feelings; ideas with identity.

I highlighted the word tribe in the first paragraph above because Weiss identifies a key point: What people call progressive really is tribalism, a form of collectivism. Instead of progress, she notes that we are regressing to tribalism.

Victimhood, in this ideology, confers morality. “I think therefore I am” is replaced with: “I am therefore I know,” and “I know therefore I am right.”

I’d add “I’ve been wronged therefore I’m moral (and you’re not).”

At the beginning I noted I see only self-censoring by those on the right because New England leans (heavily) left politically. Weiss cites the results of a study on how we self-censor.

Thus, it should come as no surprise that a recent national study from the Cato Institute found that 62% of Americans say they self-censor. The more conservative a group is, the more likely they are to hide their views: 52% of Democrats confess to self-censoring compared with 77% of Republicans.

I find it interesting that roughly one out of two Democrats police their language while three out of four Republicans hide their beliefs.

Weiss then touches on some of the forces that could have contributed to cancel culture and protective self-censorship.

The rise of this movement has taken place against the backdrop of major changes in American life — the tearing apart of our social fabric; the loss of religion and the decline of civic organizations; the opioid crisis; the collapse of American industries; the rise of big tech; the loss of faith in meritocracy; the arrogance of our elites; successive financial crises; a toxic public discourse; crushing student debt; the death of trust.

That’s fine but we could dig more for what has brought us to this state. I’ve reviewed in this blog an important book that tries to ferret out the deeper reasons: The Coddling of the American Mind: How Good Intentions and Bad Ideas Are Setting Up a Generation for Failure by Greg Lukianoff and Jonathan Haidt. They claim that the cancel culture generation has fallen under the sway of three “untruths.” They are: What doesn’t kill you makes you weaker; always trust your feelings; and life is a battle between good people and evil people.

As I said in my review of Lukianoff’s and Haidt’s book, they don’t identify the deeper premises behind the subjectivity prevalent in our universities and culture. (Note: I’m not saying everything can be reduced only to the prevailing ideas. I’m trying to avoid the mistake of reducing everything to one dimension.) Nonetheless, I think we need to look philosophy for some answers. While most of us don’t deal directly with philosophical trends in our daily lives, universities are a major transmission belt for ideas to young people who can readily absorb the ideas pushed by their professors without the real-world experience to question whether these ideas are valid.

Where do these Great Untruths come from and why are most people unable to refute them? Rather than try to provide a detailed explanation here I recommend another book to supplement The Coddling of the American Mind: Stephen R. C. Hicks, Explaining Postmodernism: Skepticism and Socialism from Rousseau to Foucault.

Hicks nicely captures the essence of postmodernism.

Metaphysically, postmodernism is anti-realist, holding that it is impossible to speak meaningfully about an independently existing reality. … Epistemologically, having rejected the notion of an independently existing reality, postmodernism denies that reason or any other method is a means of acquiring objective knowledge about that reality. Having substituted social-linguistic constructs for that reality, postmodernism emphasizes the subjectivity, conventionality, and incommensurability of those constructs. Postmodern accounts of human nature are consistently collectivist, holding that individuals’ identities are constructed largely by the social-linguistic groups that they are a part of. … Postmodern accounts of human nature also consistently emphasize relations of conflict between those groups; and given the de-emphasized or eliminated role of reason, postmodernism accounts hold that those conflicts are resolved primarily by the use of force. [Note: This was written in 2004 but accurately describes what Lukianoff and Haidt say is happening in universities today.]

In education, postmodernism rejects the notion that the purpose of education is primarily to train a child’s cognitive capacity for reason in order to produce an adult capable of functioning independently in the world. That view of education is replaced with the view that education is to take an essentially indeterminate being and give it a social identity. Education’s method of molding is linguistic, and so the language to be used is that which will create a human being sensitive to its racial, sexual and class identity. [Note: Hence the focus on language and microaggressions.]

To summarize, postmodernism says that there is no objective truth. Therefore, your feelings are as valid, if not more so, than critical, objective thinking, especially if you’re feeling oppressed. Power is used to “correct” the legacy of oppression. Therefore, it’s OK to suppress certain ideas and speakers because their oppressive ideas are dangerous, discredited, aggressive and oppressive. Power trumps truth because truth doesn’t exist; feelings trump reason and logic.

Let’s get back to Weiss’s article. I don’t know if you picked this up, but Weiss twice uses the word “pluralism” as a feature of classical liberalism. Pluralism has a number of definitions but for the purpose of this post I think the following description explains what Weiss means by pluralism.

The political philosophy of pluralism suggests that we really can and should “all just get along.” First recognized as an essential element of democracy by the philosophers of Ancient Greece, pluralism permits and even encourages a diversity of political opinion and participation. … Pluralism is a political philosophy holding that people of different beliefs, backgrounds, and lifestyles can coexist in the same society and participate equally in the political process.

There also is value pluralism. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy has this to say about value pluralism.

It is also worth emphasising that moral value pluralism does not entail relativism. The idea is not that all values or value systems are equally true. Value pluralism is independent of any particular meta-ethical view. It is a claim about the normative domain: about what value looks like.

Commonsensically we talk about lots of different values—happiness, liberty, friendship, and so on. The question about pluralism in moral theory is whether these apparently different values are all reducible to one supervalue, or whether we should think that there really are several distinct values.

I’d describe pluralism in a different way. We can individually pursue our moral values using differing value hierarchies; our political system was designed to recognize this plurality and individualism by protecting our right to pursue these values as long as we don’t impinge on the rights of people to pursue their values.

As the entry above says, pluralism doesn’t entail relativism. I agree. But there is a problem. If postmodernism banishes objective truth, there is no principle to keep pluralism from spiraling into deuces-wild relativism. Because objective ways to negotiate differences of opinions are prohibited, it comes down to who has the most power. Instead of being able to work out our differences the people who happen to be in the minority (whether it’s conservatives in New England or liberals in Trump country) end up censoring themselves. This self-censorship doesn’t just threaten democracy. It damages our relationships and the ability for us to learn from each other.

Pandemic Perceptions

I’ve recently learned a lesson in how people hear things. Yesterday I mentioned to a friend that several doctors who specialize in infectious diseases ranked various activities such as playing tennis or food shopping with 1 being the safest and 10 being the most dangerous in terms of COVID exposure. When I said that going to the grocery store was rated 3 (relatively safe) in both lists my friend thought that meant I was saying grocery shopping was dangerous, like a 7 on the scale. She then went on a rant about how she sees people doing bad things in the store. My wife confirmed that I said a 3 and had clearly explained the 1 to 10 scale.

Later in the same conversation I said that when I looked at the ratio of deaths to positive cases I noticed that Massachusetts has a ratio of 1 death for every 10 positive cases. On the other hand, states where the cases have spiked generally have a ratio of 1 death to 100 positive cases. Once again, my friend thought I was saying that the ratio of deaths in the spiking states was higher than it is here in Massachusetts. That’s because her perception is that these southern states are run by stupid Republican politicians and have a stupid population. (Hmm, I thought we’re not supposed to stereotype people.) 

(By the way, I don't know what to make of these ratios; I just was curious to see if there was a difference between the states. The ratio in the spiking states might narrow if the normal delay between the detection of infections and the uptick in deaths.)

Getting back to my friend, she casually stated later that she watches CNN all day and I know that CNN pushes the pandemic panic so I think what happened is that her filter translated what I said into what she expected to hear. I didn't bother to correct her. (What is more important is that I'm thrilled that tennis is rated #1 in safety!)

On “White Fragility” - Reporting by Matt Taibbi

Matt Taibbi just posted a long piece on the book White Fragility which he correctly takes to task. Here are his opening sentences. "A core principle of the academic movement that shot through elite schools in America since the early nineties was the view that individual rights, humanism, and the democratic process are all just stalking-horses for white supremacy. The concept, as articulated in books like former corporate consultant Robin DiAngelo’s White Fragility (Amazon’s #1 seller!) reduces everything, even the smallest and most innocent human interactions, to racial power contests."

Taibbi doesn't mention postmodernism in his article but I think this philosophy which denies the idea of objective truth is used to disarm and dismiss those who challenge this White Fragility ideology. 

Review of How to Have Impossible Conversations: A Very Practical Guide

It seems just about everyone agrees that the vicious rift in how we disagree with each other has never been worse than it is today, especially in politics. Friends have disowned each other over whether they support gun control, immigration, climate change or Trump. We all shake our heads as if this was a hopeless, irreconcilable divide. Although this might be ultimately be true I believe we should still try.

I’ve read several books and articles that offer suggestions on how to bridge this gap. Of the ones I’ve read I’d highly recommend How to Have Impossible Conversations: A Very Practical Guide by Peter Boghossian, James Lindsay. Peter Boghossian is a faculty member in the philosophy department at Portland State University and is a speaker for the Center of Inquiry and an international speaker for the Richard Dawkins Foundation for Reason and Science. James Lindsay holds degrees in physics and mathematics, with a doctorate in the latter. Because I liked this book I’ve been planning to write a review for this blog. However, this review by Eric Barker, author of Barking Up The Wrong Tree, does such a nice job hitting the key points that I’ve decided to quote from his blog entry to share the key points from How to Have Impossible Conversations.

I should note that the book’s advice is laid out in a sequence starting with beginner’s level recommended skills then intermediate and expert levels. The authors explain that they evolved these skills “drawn from the best, most effective research on applied epistemology, hostage and professional negotiations, cult exiting, subdisciplines of psychology, and more.”

Quoting more from the book, it is “organized by difficulty of application: fundamentals (Chapter 2), basics (Chapter 3), intermediate (Chapter 4), advanced (Chapter 5), expert (Chapter 6), and master (Chapter 7). Some techniques teach you to intervene in the cognition of others, instill doubt, and help people become more open to rethinking their beliefs. Other techniques are oriented toward truth-seeking. Some are just plain good advice. Their underlying commonality, regardless of your conversational goal, is that they all empower you to speak with people who have radically different political, moral, and social worldviews.”

So what are the key points of this book? Here I’ll rely on Eric Barker’s summary. (I’ve edited it slightly and added comments to explain a point if it needs to be expanded.)

·      Be a partner, not an adversary: If you’re trying to win, you’re going to lose. The best approach is: Be nice and respectful. Listen. Understand. Instill doubt. (I refuse to change my mind about this.)

·      Use Rapoport’s rules: They can seem awkward but they reduce conflict better than Valium. [I’ll add an explanation of Rapoport’s rules below.]

·      Facts are the enemy: Unless we’re talking about the savvy, attractive people who read this blog, yes, facts are the enemy. [I have some additional thoughts below.]

·      Use the “Unread Library Effect”: Let them talk. Ask questions. Let them expose their ignorance. Do not cheer when that happens.

·      Use scales: Bring extreme statements down to earth with numbered comparisons. And unless they’re certain at a level 10, they’ll mention their own doubts which can aid your cause.

·      Use disconfirmation: “Eric, under what conditions would disconfirmation not be effective?”

·      Serious beliefs are about values and identity: Don’t attack what they believe, focus on the validity of their reasoning process and whether that identity is the only way to be a good person.

What are Rapoport’s rules? Impossible Conversations explains, quoting from Daniel C. Dennett’s book Intuition Pumps and Other Tools for Thinking. (Rapoport is a game theorist.):

1.    Attempt to re-express your target’s position so clearly, vividly, and fairly that your target says, “Thanks, I wish I’d thought of putting it that way.”

2.    List any points of agreement (especially if they are not matters of general or widespread agreement).

3.    Mention anything you have learned from your target.

4.    And only then are you permitted to say so much as a word of rebuttal or criticism.

Rapoport’s rules would fall under the concept “steelmanning” in which you restate your opponent’s case in the strongest possible way before challenging it. This approach treats your partner’s beliefs more fairly than using the “straw man” approach in which you purposely weaken or exaggerate someone’s case then refute it.

What about facts? Why do Boghossian and Lindsay urge us not to argue with facts? Well, they don’t say you should never use facts. “It does mean that introducing facts into a conversation is likely to backfire unless done at the correct moment and with great care. … Many people believe what and how they do precisely because they do not formulate their beliefs on the basis of evidence – not because they’re lacking evidence. … Few people form their beliefs on the basis of rigorous consideration of reasoned arguments. Complicating matters, most people believe they do have evidence supporting their beliefs.  … We tend to form beliefs on the basis of cherry-picked selective evidence that supports what we already believe or what we want to believe. Virtually everyone formulates most of their beliefs first then subsequently looks for supporting evidence and convincing arguments that back them up.” As Jonathan Haidt says, we think we’re being detectives who piece together the facts before reaching a conclusion when in fact we act like lawyers who choose facts to make a case.

The authors conclude that introducing facts can backfire and harden your partner’s viewpoint rather than leading your partner to change their mind. They suggest that a more effective way to work facts into a conversation is through questions and by saying something like “I may be wrong about this. It’s my understanding that …”

They also offer a valuable tip on choice of words: eliminate the word “but” and replace it with “and.” For instance, instead of saying “Yes, but how should we deal with the children of illegal immigrants?” we say, “Yes, and how should we deal with the children of illegal immigrants?”

I’ve found that when I disagree with someone on a subject the person I’m talking with often asks why I disagree. They’ll ask what evidence do I have. That gives me the opening to introduce the facts I’ve used to support my conclusion. I should note that sometimes my partner doesn’t ask for my reasons. The less reasonable person will just launch into an attack because I dare to disagree with their unshakeable opinions. In that case, I might still cite my reasons but find a way to end the conversation. Diplomatically, of course!

While I admit I haven’t mastered all of the techniques in this book the key points discussed above have helped me when talking with people who don’t see things the way I do. Read How to Have Impossible Conversations because I think it is possible to have reasonable conversations.

Every Single Cognitive Bias in One Infographic

Every Single Cognitive Bias in One Infographic

This infographic shows the 188 (!) cognitive different biases that can affect how we think and the conclusions we reach.

Science has shown that we tend to make all sorts of mental mistakes, called “cognitive biases”, that can affect both our thinking and actions. These biases can lead to us extrapolating information from the wrong sources, seeking to confirm existing beliefs, or failing to remember events the way they actually happened!

Who says being objective is hard?! 😀